The scene at the crossroads seems typical of anywhere in Central Asia. The air is arid; walls and sidewalks are made of pressed mud; the sandy dust eddies and swirls down the road. The streetscape is unmistakeably Turkic and Islamic. Along the road from a mosque, on one side of the cross-street leading into the junction is a row of explicitly 
People's Republic of China [PRC] quickly reveals, Xunhua County is close to its physical centre; where the upper reaches of the Yellow River cross from Qinghai Province into Gansu Province. Xunhua in general, and Gaizi in particular-with its central Salar Alitiuli Mosque-is the epicentre of population and spiritual home for the close on 100,000 Salar. The Salar are described by the PRC as a Turkic and Islamic (Sunni) people. The majority live in Xunhua County, with a small minority based outside in the neighbouring counties of Hualong and Tongren (both in Qinghai) and Jishishan and Xiahe (both in Gansu.) Long before the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] came to power in 1949 it had committed itself to the principle of a multinational state for China, in order to politically manage the approximately 6 percent of the population who were not regarded as Han Chinese but had been subjects of the Qing Empire and became (in principle) citizens of the successor Republic after the collapse of the Empire in 1911 (Mackerras 1994; Chih-yu Shih 2002) . This was no small matter in Northwest China generally, and in particular the region on either side of the contemporary border between Qinghai and Gansu Provinces where there had been almost interminable violence after 1780 over the search for appropriate religious and political identities amongst local Muslims (Lipman 1997 ). An immediate general problem for those responsible for nationality policy in 1949 was the codification of the non-Han Chinese.
This became a state project for the first half of the 1950s and resulted (often though not always through compromises between the state's desire for both bureaucratic neatness and manageability, on the one hand, and local demands for self-identification, on the other) in the recognition of 55 'minority nationalities.'
The Salar became an officially recognized nationality in the PRC process of codification in this way at the beginning of the 1950s. Though they were one of the smallest in numbers, they were, as already noted, geographically concentrated. They also had both a high degree of self-identity, and were fairly well known in the wider community outside Xunhua, though not always for positive reasons. In addition to being long known as merchants and traders throughout the Northwest, in Ningxia, often involved in government and party-state activity.
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Gansu, and Xinjiang, as well as across Qinghai, they also had a reputation for being ferocious and violent (Lipman 1991, 65) .
The relationship between anthropological definitions of ethnicity and the PRC's nationality status is often contested, not least because for the PRC conceptions of nationality are employed in very specific political and ideological contexts.
Differences among nationalities are always explained in terms of both stages in society's unidirectional development towards (Han) civilisation, and appeals to hereditary and racial purity (Dikötter 1992) . Consequently the definition of any specific minority nationality usually identifies language and homeland within the PRC as its major determinants. The Salar understanding of exile is somewhat different to the ways in which that term has been used elsewhere, especially in the 20 th and 21 st centuries. In the first place, it is a pre-modern nation-state notion of banishment that is not associated with, or the consequence of a nationalist discourse. The word that is used in Chinese-fangzhuwas more usually employed in imperial times for the act of being sent into exile, away from the political (and cultural centre) to the frontiers of civilised culture. Given that the Empire ruled 'all under heaven' with control and influence stronger at the centre and weaker at the periphery there was necessarily little of the 20 th century notion of exile to beyond the boundaries of the state to be found in this conceptualisation. To complicate matters, in the Salar case the experience now recounted as 'exile' was not 4 The PRC interpretation of this process is outlined in Fei 1981 (Yang Xiaoping 1986; Chen Binyuan 1986) .
One result of these cultural politics is that in contrast to the experience of other exiles, the Salar do not present themselves as victims. On the contrary, the evidence of a recent survey of Salar businessmen and community leaders suggests that discourses of exile and migration are now once again in use as instruments of Salar mobilisation and wealth generation towards the positive creation of a Sino-Muslim identity.
Qinghai Province was generally slow to adapt to the social and economic opportunities presented during the 1980s and 1990s by the reform of the earlier There is a strong and growing electricity-generating industry, centred on two still fairly new hydroelectric stations on the Yellow River. It is common to meet Salar all over China's northwest. Some, as in the past, are travelling merchants and salesmen.
In more recent developments Xunhua now also supports a substantial number of As these proportions suggest when compared to relativities in the population as a whole, there may at times have been an uneasy relationship between the Salar and the Chinese state. The key to understanding that interaction lies in Xunhua's cultural geography, or more accurately that of the wider environment outside the county.
Although for the Chinese empire and even for those Chinese who lived in the Gansu- 
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During the 18 th century a number of Hezhou District Muslim preachers and scholars started to travel to the Middle East, on pilgrimage and to study. One of the more charismatic of these was Ma Laichi who on his return gained considerable publicity and following for his particular ideas (known as Khafiya) by instigating and winning a court case about the correct order of prayer and eating during Ramadan: he argued that at that time it was more appropriate to eat before evening prayers as against the then current practice of eating after (Trippner 1964, 264) . In 1750 Teaching'-which by then had become the polarities of conflict for Sufi adherentsas well as an increase in communal violence led the Qing legal process to find in favour of the latter (Lipman 1997, 142) . Almost needless to say, the measures employed by the state to sinicise the Salar were not successful, and merely drove Salar religious and social practices underground and out of sight.
Repression continued for the best part of twenty-four years. In the early 1980s as the reform agenda started to emerge from the CCP in Beijing, a new approach was adopted towards all minority nationalities, including those such as the Salar who had demonstrated their opposition in the more recent past. The more tolerant approach was almost certainly a pragmatic response to the needs of economic rationalism.
Nonetheless it was cautiously welcomed in Xunhua, especially when all but a few (those identified as 'the leaders') of those arrested for involvement in the rebellions of the 1950s were pardoned. This included those who were still in 'reform through labour camps' as well as those who had already been released from other state The first recorded use of the name 'Salar' appears to have been in Qing records.
When describing the impact of the visit of the early Sufi, Muhammed Yusuf, to
Hezhou and its surrounds during the late 1640s, local magistrates described his influence in converting the Salar (Mi Yizhi 1982; Lipman 1997, 59 Akhma.) They felt that life in their home village had become intolerable because of discrimination against them by the village headman, so they decided to leave for somewhere more amenable. They set off from the village accompanied by various relatives, clanspeople and possibly others from the village. They took with them a white camel for porterage; a bowl of soil and a kettle of water from their home village;
and a copy of the Koran. The journey was long and arduous and involved crossing many mountain ranges and rivers. They moved eastward through present day Xinjiang into present day Gansu and then into present day Ningxia. Once there, they turned back westward. Sometime after the two brothers had left their native place other of their clanspeople, villagers and relatives (about forty-five people in all) also decided to follow. They too had an arduous journey, but instead of following the brothers' tracks exactly ended up going south of Qinghai Lake. A couple of this company decamped there but the others continued and were able to eventually meet up with Kharimang and Ahwang in present day Xunhua County at Mengda, from where they moved on to Alitiuli.
Once everyone arrived in Alitiuli they were all exhausted, and the camel was tired, hungry and thirsty. Rest was called for. At midnight Kharimang woke up to find the camel had disappeared. He woke everyone else up and they went off looking for the camel. By dawn they had not been successful but by now were very thirsty. Looking for water they found the camel had turned into stone, next to a spring, with water
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coming out of its mouth. This was a shock to the travellers who had become quite attached to the camel during their wanderings. Kharimang took up the Koran they had brought with and asked for Allah's blessings for the camel and themselves. They then drank the spring water and found it more than acceptable. They then compared the water and soil in Alitiuli with the water and soil they had brought with and decided both that they were the same and that Allah had helped them find a good place to settle. According to this folk tale the date was the 13 th day of the 5 th moon in the 3 rd year of the Hongwu Reign of the Ming Dynasty (7 June 1370.)
The various elements of this version of the Salar myth of origin are not hard to place.
At its core is the Camel Play (Döye oyna) that was performed regularly as part of Alitiuli. Indeed in the not-so-distant past, the lake in question was turned into a walled park, not least because it was said that for the faithful it was possible to see the stone camel at the bottom of the lake. For the less faithful, a replica stone camel has been erected in the park. Moreover, a much earlier observation of the oral traditions surrounding the Salar has them being thrown out of their home villages because of their violent behaviour, an understandable possible cause of adverse reaction from a worried headman dealing with a troublesome family (Trippner 1964, 247) .
These inconsistencies and confusions throw doubt upon the specific current accounts of Salar exile but not necessarily exile or migration in general, for at least some of the ancestors of those now described as Salar. The Salar language certainly has a confirmed Turkic base though it also has considerable Chinese and Amdo Tibetan modifications and additions (Dwyer 1996) . 
Social activism
While there may be no solid evidence of exile or banishment, to concentrate on this omission is to miss the point. Interesting as questions of historical accuracy may be they are less than relevant for understanding the role of Salars in the contemporary society of Northwest China. The revival of Salar identity that started in the early 1980s is in many ways yet another example of the emergence of explicitly localist discourses of development that encourage and facilitate increased economic development, particularly beyond the boundaries of the state sector, that has been a fairly common feature of the PRC's political economy since the early 1990s (Oakes 2002, 837-62) .
At the same time the Salar revival is distinctive because it was not (as was the case elsewhere in the PRC) state initiated, though it has clearly gained a substantial measure of later state support. 15 Moreover, the Salar case is particularly unusual in Qinghai where almost uniquely among the PRC's provincial-level jurisdictions the encouragement of provincial and localist discourses has generally been absent from the agenda of the party-state (Goodman 2004, 379-99) . Religion, language, and Xunhua have been key pillars in the elaboration of Salar identity, that reinforce feelings of community and solidarity and encourage individuals to economic activism.
So too is exile, which helps the Salar believe they have a competitive advantage that comes from not being fundamentally native to the area in which they live and operate, despite having been born and grown up there. They see themselves as being both more mobile than those around them and more dynamic elements in the development of society.
14 Joseph Trippner 'Die Salaren: ihre ersten Glaubensstreitigkeiten und ihr Austand 1781' ['The Salars: Their First Belief Conflicts and Rebellion, 1781'] in Central Asiatic Survey Vol.9, no.4, 1964, 261. 15 Evidenced considerably in Ma Chengjun 1999.
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The self-attributed case for Salar exceptionalism, and in particular the link between the nationality's origins in exile, on the one hand, and social and economic activism, products. Necessarily because of its output the factory is a center of community focus.
In particular, designs and product ideas are provided from the community. Han's own experience had previously been that of a trader around north and southwest China, which he said had provided him with a broader perspective than most people in Qinghai had.
Manager Ma runs a chili paste production factory in Gaizi. a visit to Inner Mongolia. We need logos and symbols to represent Salar identity to the outside world as well as to ourselves.' One result was the development of his family folklore enterprise.
Han Zenaibai (also known as Han Yulan) 25 is an 'outsider' not only because she is Salar, but also because she is a woman, in a society that for all its progressiveness in some ways also remains essentially fundamentalist about the role of women. She is now a well-known entrepreneur in Xunhua, and even to some extent beyond, but originally she made her name as a basketball player in regional and national championship teams (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) Clearly a bit of a tomboy in her youth, Han Zenaibai is probably Xunhua's first feminist. She admitted to being a Salar traditionalist but explained that this meant in her interpretation that (amongst other things) the Salar could achieve anything they set out to do, and from the start she could not see why all of Salar customs had to privilege men. 'In the very beginning (of reform) men started to set up businesses. I knew there were women starting businesses in foreign countries, and I wanted to try.
In 1996, I successfully applied on my own to get 400,000 yuan from the Development Bank in Xining.' For her pains she became enshrined as the prototype of the Salar 
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